Prior research has demonstrated that allocators frequently distribute greater rewards to persons with high professional and geographic mobility than to persons with constrained mobility, especially among the very competent. This phenomenon has been termed rational selective exploitation. Do the recipients of such allocations actually experience this distribution rule as unjust and distressing, or is it a misnomer to refer to this phenomenon as exploitation? Two studies were conducted to explore this question. Study 1 was a laboratory experiment in which we manipulated relative performance level, relative mobility level, and allocation standard: performance based versus mobility based. Study 2 was a cross-sectional survey of actual employees in which subjects reported the degree to which performance and mobility were the basis for pay decisions at their places of employment, as well as the degree to which they perceived each standard to be fair. Both studies demonstrated that people regard mobility-based allocations as less fair and more distressing than performance-based allocations. Furthermore, the degree of distress resulting from mobility-based allocations is greater among persons who are disadvantaged by that standard: among people with constrained mobility, especially those who perform at high levels. These findings provide good support for the assertion that so-called rational selective exploitation is indeed distressing to employees. Reactions to this form of distress are also explored, and the implications of these findings for the allocation process are discussed.
How do we feel when the outcomes allocated in a group are based at least in part on members' professional or geographic mobility? Much research and theory support the claim that people like to be equitably compensated for their contributions to group goals. The equity norm specifies that outcomes should be distributed to group members on the basis of merit, in proportion to their contributions to group goals (i.e, performance). Indeed, research on allocation processes reveals that distributions are frequently commensurate with individual merit and that group members are more satisfied with equitable distributions than with other standards (Carrell, 1978; Freedman, 1978; Lane & Messe, 1971; Leventhal & Michaels, 1969; Leventhal, Weiss, & Long, 1969; Pritchard, Dunnette, & Jorgenson, 1972; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) . According to Adams (1965) , people feel distressed when they perceive that the relationship between their inputs and outcomes is inequitable in comparison to that of other group members. In turn, the experience of distress leads to attempts to restore feelings of equity by Study 1 was Mary Ann Campbell's senior honors thesis, and Study 2 was based on data obtained in conjunction with Mildred E. Price's senior honors thesis. Both studies were supported by grants from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Parents' Council Research Award Program, administered by the University of North Carolina honors office. We wish to thank Chet Insko, Norbert Kerr, and several anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on a draft of this article. Also, we express our gratitude to the many allocators whose intriguing decisions served as the inspiration for this body of research.
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However, prior research has demonstrated that allocators do not always distribute rewards solely on the basis of individual performance. Numerous researchers and theorists have argued that a variety of alternative normative standards may influence group allocations-for example, equality, seniority, need, or equal opportunity (Deutsch, 1975; Elliott & Meeker, 1986; fblger, 1984; Insko, Gilmore, Moehie, Lipsitz, & Thibaut, 1982; Leventhal, 1976; Reis, 1984) . Also, fairness may be only one of several important allocation goals. Allocations may also be based on instrumental goals such as minimizing conflict, enhancing productivity, or maintaining stable membership (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Greenberg & Leventhal, 1976; Leventhal, 1976; Reis, 1984) . Furthermore, although equity theory describes the process by which group allocations change from inequitable to equitable, the theory does not provide an account of the origins of inequity (deCarufel, 1981; Greenberg, 1981; Homans, 1976) .
In their explorations of an interesting deviation from equity, Rusbult and her colleagues Rusbult, Insko, Lin, & Smith, 1990; Rusbult, Lowery, Hubbard, Maravankin, & Neises, 1988) have found that although managers typically distribute greater rewards to more competent people, employee competence and mobility frequently interact in influencing allocations. In eight separate experiments, these authors demonstrated that among the highly competent, those with greater geographic or professional mobility receive larger portions of the reward pool; the less competent receive lower outcomes, and variations in mobility have less impact on their rewards.
1 Rusbult, Lowery, Hubbard, Maravankin, and Neises (1988) termed this phenomenon rational selective exploitation: This allocation tendency is rational in that it serves to maintain stable membership among high performers. However, it is exploitative in that it results in an erosion of equity among competent but entrapped employees. Given that employee mobility is frequently limited by factors that have nothing to do with performance levels-for example, by professional spouses, school-age children, or home ownership (cf. Thibaut & Kelley, 1959 )-this deviation from equity is especially interesting.
Prior research has demonstrated that although group managers frequently base allocation decisions at least in part on mobility considerations, the tendency to do so, and in particular the tendency to engage in rational selective exploitation, is especially acute under certain circumstances Rusbult et al., 1990) . Rational selective exploitation is more likely when allocators are induced to adopt a more instrumental orientation to the allocation situation and is less likely given social-emotional orientation. Rational selective exploitation is also more probable under conditions of resource and labor pool constraint, when the supply of rewards or competent employees, or both, is limited. And rational selective exploitation is somewhat more probable when future allocations are anticipated, when opportunities to later undo such inequities are available. However, these situational characteristics merely intensify a tendency that is evident under all allocation conditions explored to date. Indeed, rational selective exploitation is not limited to Western industrial cultures: This phenomenon has been observed among subjects in both the United States and China. Rational selective exploitation is clearly a robust phenomenon.
How do employees feel about this allocation standard? Although prior research has consistently demonstrated that managers engage in rational selective exploitation, no previous work has examined employee reactions to this phenomenon. The term rational selective exploitation may even be a misnomer. Employees may believe that it is important to retain the most valuable group members, they may believe that the best way to do so is to allocate greater rewards to desirable members who might otherwise leave the group, and they may not find rational selective exploitation to be distressing. If employees do acknowledge and accept this standard, the importance of studying this form of behavior to some degree becomes moot: If the standard has instrumental value and employees do not find it to be objectionable, why bother to study the conditions that promote it? Instead, why not recommend that it be adopted as formal policy? Because we believe that rational selective exploitation may well be distressing and that it may lead to negative consequences for theorganization, it is important to obtain empirical evidence relevant to this question.
We believe that employees are likely to react negatively to rational selective exploitation because it is a meaningful departure from equity. Whereas some nonmerit allocation standards may be regarded as understandable in that they may further admirable organizational goals (e.g.. equality, equal opportunity), the message implicitly conveyed to the victims of rational selective exploitation is "you are very good at your job but you are trapped, so I can and will treat you as I wish." Also, the mere prevalence of performance-based allocations may cause employees to feel dissatisfied with many nonmerit standards. Thus, we predict that mobility-based allocations, especially rational selective exploitation, will be regarded as less fair than those based on performance. Also, we predict that the distress engendered by mobility-based allocations will be especially acute among those who suffer most as a consequence: low mobility employees, particularly those who are very competent.
Although we are ultimately most concerned with reactions to the rational selective exploitation effect-the interaction of competence and mobility or the tendency to attend to mobility among the competent but not among the less competent-the present work studies simple mobility-based allocations, ignoring whether mobility potentially applies to all employees or primarily applies to the competent. We reached this decision because we believed it would be most appropriate to begin with the simplest feature of rational selective exploitation, the feature that most directly defines the manner in which this standard departs from equity. If anything, this strategy should serve to obscure strong allocation-inspired distress, because it is probably less upsetting to attend to mobility among the less competent than it is to do so among the competent. Also, although our work focuses primarily on satisfaction and perceptions of fairness, we also examine reactions to distress: distortions in perceptions of performance or effort, decisions to leave the distressing situation, and selection of a less disturbing comparison person. We expect that if an individual reacts to distress with any one of these distress-reducing mechanisms, discomfort may be attenuated and the need to engage in other methods may be eliminated; that is, the several reactions may be substitutable. Thus, the results with respect to these measures may be weaker than those for general feelings of distress.
Two studies were designed to explore these issues. Study 1 was a laboratory experiment that examined reactions to performance-based and mobility-based allocations among persons differing in competence and mobility. Study 2 was a cross-sectional survey study in which actual employees reported on prior exposure to mobility-based allocations. Together, the studies should provide good evidence regarding individual reactions to the experience of mobility-based allocations.
Study 1
Study 1 experimentally manipulated allocation standard (performance based versus mobility based), relative performance level (high versus low), and relative mobility level (high versus low). Feelings of fairness and satisfaction, reactions to distress, and stated reasons for reactions were measured. As outlined 1 Note that managers allocate greater rewards to competent and mobile employees than to equally competent but entrapped employees, despite recognizing that they do not differ in merit. Rusbult, Lowery, Hubbard, Maravankin, and Neises (1988) manipulated employee mobility through variations in employee features that were unrelated to work competence (e.g., through variations in spousal employment, home ownership, school-age children). Furthermore, these authors demonstrated that judgments of employee competence were not significantly influenced by variations in employee-mobility level: Allocators did not believe that employees with greater mobility were more capable.
earlier, we predicted not only that subjects would be less satisfied with mobility-based allocations than with performancebased allocations but also that being subjected to mobilitybased allocations would be especially distressing to those who lost as a result of the application of that standard (Le., people with low mobility). Furthermore, we predicted that distress would be greatest among those who were the most direct victims of rational selective exploitation: people who performed at high levels but had constrained mobility. Thus, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1: There will be a main effect of allocation standard; subjects in the mobility-based allocations condition will experience greater distress than those in the performancebased condition.
Hypothesis 2: Allocation standard will interact with mobility level: Within the mobility-based allocations condition, subjects in the low-mobility condition will experience greater distress than those in the high-mobility condition; variations in mobility will not have as great an impact on feelings of distress under conditions of performance-based allocations.
Hypothesis 3: Allocation standard, performance level, and mobility level will interact: The discrepancy between low-and high-mobility subjects will be greater among high-performance subjects exposed to mobility-based allocations than among subjects in any other condition.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 97 students from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who participated in partial fulfillment of the requirements for introductory psychology courses. Forty-seven men and 50 women were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. A maximum of six same-sex subjects participated in each session. To avoid biasing our sample, payment for participation was not mentioned on sign-up sheets. However, on arrival, subjects were informed that a supervisor would pay them for their work and that they could earn from $4 to $8 during the course of the experiment. In fact, all subjects were paid $5 for participation.
Procedure. The study was described as a simulation of working conditions in a newspaper newsroom. Subjects were informed that they would initially be assigned to one of four tasks and that they would work on that task for three sessions. Each subject would also be assigned an alternate task, a task the subject could switch to at the end of three sessions. At the end of each work session, the subject's work would be scored and evaluated by a supervisor, who would determine how much to pay the subject and another employee. Each supervisor could eifectively deal with only two employees at a time but had a total of six 2-hour sessions to ensure that a specified amount of quality work was completed on each task. The supervisor's overall management score would be based on how well he or she managed the employees under his or her supervision.
In fact, all subjects were initially assigned the task of decoding telex messages. Essays printed with alternate symbols substituted for certain letters and punctuation marks were to be decoded (printed correctly). For example, alternate symbols might be substituted for all punctuation marks (e.g.. | instead of a period, / instead of a comma), alternate letters might be substituted for letters that normally had tails below the line (e.g^ +x instead of a y), capital letters might be indicated using a special convention (e.g., #d instead of a D), there might be no spaces between words, or all letters might be capitalized (e.g., A M P L E M A KETHISBED...).
Each subject was assigned to a work cubicle. The supervisor delivered work materials for the assigned task and explained how to complete it. At the end of 3 min, completed work was collected and the supervisor took the subject's work to another room to score it and determine pay levels. After several minutes, the supervisor delivered faked feedback information. Feedback forms included handwritten information on the subject's and "another worker's" assigned task, alternate task, performance level, pay level for that session, cumulative pay, and an explanation of the basis for pay. Subjects examined this information and then received materials for the next session. At the end of three sessions, the experimenter delivered questionnaires to subjects. Subjects were then informed that the experiment was over and were debriefed and paid $5 for their participation.
Independent variables.
Relative performance level was manipulated through variations in the feedback delivered at the end of each work session. The supervisor checked one of seven performance scores for the subject and the other worker (inadequate, poor, below average, average, above average, good, or excellent). This feedback indicated that the subject was performing at either higher or lower levels than the other worker. For example, for Session 1, high-performance subjects received a score of above average, and the other worker was scored average; for Session 3, high-performance subjects received a score of good, and the other worker was scored average. This feedback was reversed for subjects in the low-performance condition.
Relative mobility level was manipulated through variations in the alternate tasks assigned to the subject and the other worker. All subjects were assigned the same initial task, decoding telex messages, which was described as moderately desirable (overall rating = 5.8). Half of the subjects-those in the high-mobility condition-were informed verbally and in writing that their alternate task was setting type for the printing press, which received very high ratings (overall rating = 7.1), and that the other worker's alternate task was translating copy from reporters' speed-writing, which received low ratings (overall rating = 4.5). These circumstances were reversed for subjects in the low-mobility condition: Subjects in this condition were assigned the less attractive alternate task; the other worker was assigned the highly desirable alternate task.
Allocation standard was manipulated through variations in the stated basis for pay. In the performance-based allocations condition, high-performance subjects were consistently paid more than the other worker; low-performance subjects were paid less. In the mobilitybased condition, high-mobility subjects were paid more than the other worker, and low-mobility subjects were paid less. To control for absolute expectations regarding appropriate pay, actual amount of pay was consistent across conditions, but the pay the other worker received varied. The allocation standard manipulation was reinforced through an explanation the supervisor wrote at the bottom of the form, an explanation describing the basis for the decisions. For example, at the end of Session 1, subjects read: "It was important that I encourage high performance, because I've got to get more work completed on this task. Thus, I gave higher pay to employees who performed at higher levels, as a way of encouraging them to continue to perform at high levels" versus "It was important that I retain all my employees, because I've got to get more work completed on this task. Thus, 1 gave higher pay to employees who had attractive alternate tasks available, as a way of encouraging them to stick with this task-the task they were initially assigned."
Questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, all questionnaire items. were 9-point scales ranging from not at all (0) to extremely (8). The manipulation checks for the relative performance level variable were "How well did you perform on the task in comparison to the other worker?" and "How well did you perform on the task in comparison to the typical participant in this experiment?" The manipulation check on the relative mobility level variable was "How did your alternate job compare to the other worker's alternate job (i.e., did one or both of you have an attractive alternate task available)?" The effectiveness of the allocation standard manipulation was assessed in two ways. First, subjects completed two checklists. One asked, "On what basis did your supervisor distribute pay?" The options were based on our effort expenditure (trying hard to do welt), based on our performance (better, worse, or equal work) , based on what was fair, based on whether we might switch to an alternate task, based on our motivation to perform well at the job, and based on how well he/she liked each of us. The second checklist asked, "What do you think the supervisor was trying to accomplish through his or her pay decisions?" The options were trying to encourage us to exert more effort (to try harder), trying to encourage us to perform better, trying to do what was fair, trying to get us to stick with our current tasks, trying to encourage greater motivation to perform well at the job, and trying to reward the ones he/she liked best. Options were scored 1 if they were checked and 0 if they were not checked. The second way in which the effectiveness of the allocation manipulation was assessed was through six Likert-type scales. All of these scales began with "to what degreedidyoursupervisorbasehisorherpaydecisionson. . ";thesix scales ended with "how well workers performed," "what seemed fair to him/her," "how well he or she liked each of you," "your motivation to perform well at the task," "how likely you were to switch to an alternate task," and "how hard you worked."
Perception of procedural fairness was measured with three items: "How fair was the supervisor's standard for distributing pay (i.e., the rule he/she used in deciding on salary levels)," "How satisfied were you with the supervisor's standard for distributing pay (i.e., the rule he/she used in deciding on salary levels)," and "How fair were the supervisor's decisions regarding the division of pay among workers?" Feelings of job satisfaction were measured with two items: "In general, how satisfied do you feel with this work situation" and "If this were an actual work setting, how well do you think you would like your job?" Pay satisfaction was measured with "how fair was the amount of pay you received for your work on the task" and "how satisfied were you with the pay you received for your work on the task?" Perception of unbiased decisions was measured with "do you feel that there was any inappropriate bias in the supervisor's decision regarding your pay" and "do you feel that there was any inappropriate bias in the supervisor's decision regarding the other worker's pay?" Finally, perception of pay appropriateness was assessed with "in your judgment, was the pay you received for your work on this task an appropriate amount" and "how fair was the amount of pay the other worker received for his or her work on the task?" Judgments of personal effort expenditure were measured with "in general, how much effort did you exert to do well at your assigned task" and "did you work as hard on later sessions as you did on the first work session?" Judgments of the quality of own performance were measured with "in general, how well did you perform on this task," "how well did you perform on this task relative to the other worker," "how well do you think you performed on this task relative to other workers who were paid less than you " and "how well do you think you performed relative to other workers who were paid the same as you?" The item "how well do you think you performed on this task in relation to other workers who were paid more" was intended to be included in this cluster but did not correlate with the other items and was therefore analyzed separately. Judgments of the other worker^ performance were measured with "how well did the other worker perform on this task," "how well did the other worker perform on this task relative to other participants in this experiment," "in general, how much effort did the other worker exert to do well at this task," and "how well did the other worker perform on this task relative to your own performance?"
Desire to quit was measured with "during early sessions, if you could have switched to a good alternate task, would you have done so" and "if this were a real job and you had a good alternate job otter, how likely is it that you would take your alternate offer?" Actual decisions to quit were measured using answers to a checklist item that begin with "at present, would you like to continue with this task, switch to your alternate task, or quit working altogether?" Subjects checked one of the following: / want to continue with this task, I want to switch to the alternate task, or / want to quit working f/.e, end the experiment). If the subject checked an item, he or she received a score of 1; otherwise the item was scored 0. The first two items, measuring decisions to continue with the initial task (reverse scored) and decisions to switch to the alternate task, were averaged to form a single measure of actual decisions to quit. The third item, measuring decisions to quit the experiment, did not correlate with the other items and was therefore treated separately in the actual analyses. Subjects who indicated that they wanted to switch tasks or quit the experiment were also asked to indicate their reasons, using the following scale: "If you indicated that you wanted to switch tasks or quit working, note which of the following best represent your reasons" Their options were / feel that the other worker should have been given equal pay for equal performance, and he/she was not, I feel that I should have been given equal pay for equal performance, and I was not, I am tired of this experiment, I feel that others should not have been given higher pay because they had better alternate jobs, and / feel that I should not have been given higher pay because I had a better alternate job. The latter two items were combined to form a single measure of belief that mobility should not be the basis for pay decisions.
Rejection of comparison person was measured with the item "if this were an actual job, how would you feel about being coworkers with the other worker in your session?" Preferences for type of feedback were assessed by two questions. First, subjects were asked, "If you were able to choose the amount and type of feedback you received about your own and others' pay, what would you prefer?" The options were feedback on my own and the other worker's pay and feedback on my own and a different workers pay. Second, they were asked, "Why did you select this type of feedback?" The options were seeing the other workers pay makes me feel bad about my own pay, seeing the other workers pay makes me feel good about my own pay, and seeing a different worker's pay would make me feel better about my own pay.
Reliability of measures. Several items were averaged to form a single measure of some constructs. To ensure that it was appropriate to do so, reliability coefficients were calculated. These analyses revealed acceptable alphas for perception of procedural fairness (91), job satisfaction (.79), pay satisfaction (.79), perception of unbiased decisions (.88), perception of pay appropriateness (.74), personal effort expenditure £56), quality of own performance (.76), quality of other's performance (.72), desire to quit (.52), actual decisions to quit (.84), the belief that mobility should not be the basis for pay decisions (.21), the performance manipulation check (.93), and the manipulation checks regarding the basis for pay being performance (.86), mobility (.95), motivation C51), fairness (.59), and effort £42). Although a few coefficients were lower than ideal, inspection of the resultant pattern of means and significant effects for the individual items revealed that the findings for the items within each set were quite similar, so the averaged measures were retained.
Results
Manipulation checks. To assess the reliability of the experimental manipulations, three-variable analyses of variance were performed on the manipulation checks. In comparison to subjects in the low-performance condition, those in the high-performance condition reported that their performance was superior (2.13 vs. 6.00), F(l, 86) = 204.08, p < .001. In comparison to subjects in the low-mobility condition, those in the high-mobility condition reported that their alternate task was more de-sirable (1.35 vs. 6.83), F\l, 86) = 230.69, p < .001. And in comparison to subjects in the mobility-based-al locations condition, a higher percentage of those in the performance-based condition reported that pay was based on performance (23% vs. 99%), f(l, 89) = 55.95, p < .001, and that pay was not based on mobility (92% vs. 3%), F(l, 89) = 356.07, p < .001.
2 Also, in comparison to subjects in the mobility-based condition, those in the performance-based condition reported that their supervisors based pay decisions more on performance levels (2.78 vs. 7.11), F(\, 89) = 125.45, p < .001, and less on employee mobility (7.19 vs. 2.16), F(l, 89)-130.02, p < .001.
3
Hypothesis 1: Main effect of allocation standard. Three 3-variable multivariate analyses of variance were performed to test our hypotheses. The primary analysis included the five measures of perceived fairness and satisfaction, a second analysis included the seven measures of reactions to distress, and a third analysis included the nine measures of reasons for reactions. An analysis of variance summary table is presented in Table 1 , and means for all measures for which statistically significant findings were obtained are displayed in Table 2 . Hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects experiencing mobility-based allocations would feel less satisfied and more distressed than would subjects experiencing performance-based allocations. As hypothesized, the multivariate analysis revealed a significant main effect of allocation standard: In comparison to subjects in the performance-based condition, those in the mobility-based condition reported significantly lower perceptions of procedural fairness, job satisfaction, satisfaction with pay, perception that the supervisor's pay decisions were unbiased, and perceptions of pay appropriateness.
Of secondary importance, we expected that exposure to mobility-based allocations might induce reactions to distress. Indeed, these measures were significantly influenced by the allocation standard main effect. In comparison to subjects in the performance-based condition, those in the mobility-based condition reported that they performed at higher levels than others who were paid more and said they didn't want to work with the person to whom their performance was being compared. We also assessed subjects' reasons for their reactions. The multivariate main effect of allocation standard was only marginally significant, and only one of nine reasons revealed significant findings. In comparison to subjects in the performance-based condition, those in the mobility-based condition were more likely to report that they should have received equal pay for equal work and did not.
Hypothesis 2; Impact of relative mobility level, given mobilitybased allocations. Hypothesis 2 predicted an interaction of relative mobility level with allocation standard: given mobilitybased allocations, low-mobility subjects should feel more distressed than should high-mobility subjects. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the Mobility Level x Allocation Standard interaction significantly influenced perceived fairness and satisfaction. Tests of simple effects revealed that within the mobilitybased condition, low-mobility subjects reported lower perceptions of procedural fairness, job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, perceptions of unbiased decisions, and perceptions of pay appropriateness than did high-mobility subjects. Within the performance-based condition, low-mobility subjects and high-mobility subjects did not differ significantly with respect to any of these measures.
We also explored reactions to distress and reasons for reactions. For reactions to distress, there was a marginally significant multivariate interaction of allocation standard with mobility. Within the mobility-based condition, compared with highmobility subjects, low-mobility subjects reported greater desire to quit the task and less interest in working with the comparison person. Neither effect was significant within the performance-based condition. Reasons for reactions were also influenced by the Allocation Standard X Mobility interaction. Within the mobility-based condition, low-mobility subjects reported that they should have received equal pay for equal work and did not, that seeing the other's pay made them feel bad, and that seeing the other's pay did not make them feel good. We were surprised to discover that within the mobility-based condition, high-mobility subjects were more likely to say that mobility should not have been the basis for pay decisions. None of these effects were significant within the performance-based condition.
Hypothesis 3: Impact of mobility level among high-performance subjects, given mobility-based allocations. Hypothesis 3 predicted an interaction of allocation standard, performance, and mobility: Given mobility-based allocations, the greatest discrepancy in feelings of satisfaction and fairness should occur among people whose performance was high but whose mobility differed. As hypothesized, the three-variable multivariate interaction of allocation standard, performance level, and mobility level was significant. Tests of simple effects revealed that within the high-performance mobility-based condition, low-mobility 2 There was also a three-variable interaction of allocation standard, performance level, and mobility level for reports that supervisors based their decisions on performance: Subjects in the high-performance, low-mobility mobility-based condition reported that pay was in no way based on performance {M= 1.85 for this condition, M= 3.08 for the other mobility-based conditions, and M = 7.11 for the performance-based conditions), /"(I, 89) = 4.07, p < .047.
3 These analyses also revealed several additional significant findings: First, in comparison to subjects in the mobility-based condition, a higher percentage of those in the performance-based condition reported that pay was based on motivation (14% vs. 38%), F(l, 89) = 14.93, p < -00K effort (9% vs. 35%), F{1, 89) = 11.31, p < .001, and fairness (1% vs. 13%), F(\, 89) = 7.27, p < .008. Second, in comparison to subjects in the mobility-based condition, those in the performancebased condition reported that their supervisors based their pay decisions on effort (M = 2.61 vs. 3.83), F(l, 89) = 6.06, p < .016, and fairness (M = 2.60 vs. 4.69), F(l, 89) = 22.18, p < .001. Third, in comparison with subjects in the low-performance condition, those in the high-performance condition perceived that their supervisors based pay decisions on motivation (M= 2.44 vs. 3.91), F(l, 89) =12.81, p < .001, and effort (M = 2.56 vs. 3.88), F(U 89) = 8.26, p < .005. Fourth, there was a two-variable interaction of allocation standard with performance level for the measure of effort-based pay: Within the performance-based condition, subjects in the high-performance condition perceived that their pay was more strongly based on effort than did subjects in the low-performance condition, F(\, 89) = 5.94, p < .017. Because these effects are relatively weak in comparison with the effects reported earlier and because none of these effects are surprising, given the spirit of the current design, the manipulations were judged to have created the intended conditions. subjects reported lower procedural fairness, job satisfaction, pay satisfaction, perceptions of unbiased decisions, and perceptions of pay appropriateness. Within the low-performance mobility-based condition, only one measure was influenced by variations in mobility: High-mobility subjects reported greater pay satisfaction than did low-mobility subjects. Variations in relative mobility did not significantly influence perceptions of fairness and satisfaction within the other two conditions. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was strongly supported. Reactions to distress were marginally influenced by the Allocation Standard X Performance Level X Mobility Level interaction. Tests of simple effects revealed that within the high-performance mobility-based condition, low-mobility subjects reported marginally greater personal effort expenditure, said they performed better than did others who were paid more, and said they didn't want to work with the comparison person. None of the mobility effects were significant in the other three conditions. Also, analysis of subjects* reasons for their reactions revealed a marginal three-variable interaction of allocation standard, performance, and mobility. Tests of simple effects revealed that within the high-performance mobility-based condition, low-mobility subjects reported that they should have received equal pay for equal work and did not, that seeing the others pay made them feel bad, and that seeing the other's pay did not make them feel good. Variations in mobility did not influence stated reasons for reactions within the other three conditions.
Other findings. Consistent with the reasoning underlying Hypothesis 2, these analyses also revealed several Allocation Standard X Relative Performance interactions. Just as subjects hurt by the mobility rule were less happy within the mobilitybased condition than were subjects advantaged by that rule, subjects hurt by the performance rule were less happy within the performance-based condition than were subjects advantaged by that rule. First, the Allocation Standard x Performance interaction significantly affected perceived fairness and satisfaction. Within the performance-based condition, highperformance subjects reported greater perceived fairness and satisfaction than did low-performance subjects; none of the simple effects of performance level were significant within the mo- bility-based condition. Similarly, the Allocation Standard X Performance interaction influenced reactions to distress. However, there was only one measure for which the simple effect of performance was significant, given performance-based allocations but not mobility-based allocations.
The analysis also revealed several effects that were essentially by-products of the results reported earlier. There was one significant Performance X Mobility interaction: Within the high-performance condition, low-mobility subjects were more distressed than were high-mobility subjects; this effect was not significant within the low-performance condition. Also, there were eight significant main effects of relative performance-in general, high-performance subjects were happier, felt they'd performed better, and said mobility should not be the basis for pay decisions. Finally, there were seven main effects of mobility -in general, low-mobility subjects were less happy with the situation and felt that it was generally unfair. Interestingly, subjects in the high-mobility condition were more likely than those in the low-mobility condition to report that mobility should not be the basis for pay decisions.
Sex of subject. Three 4-variable multivariate analyses were performed to determine whether our findings differed for women and men. This analysis included 21 dependent variables for 8 different effects involving subject sex, for a total of 168 effects. The analysis revealed only 10 significant effects involving subject sex, which suggests that the results were not strongly influenced by this variable. These findings were scattered and inconsistent, so they will not be discussed.
Discussion
Study 1 provided excellent support for our predictions. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, subjects exposed to mobility-based allocations evidenced consistently lower perceived fairness and satisfaction than did subjects exposed to performance-based allocations. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, within the mobilitybased allocations condition, subjects in the low-mobility condition evidenced consistently lower perceived fairness and satisfaction than did those in the high-mobility condition; this effect was not significant within the performance-based condition. And consistent with Hypothesis 3, among high-performance subjects in the mobility-based condition, low-mobility subjects evidenced consistently lower perceived fairness and satisfaction than did high-mobility subjects; the mobility effect was not significant within the other three conditions. Thus, people are apparently far less satisfied with mobility-based allocations than they are with performance-based allocations, and the distress produced by mobility-based allocations is apparently greatest among people who lose because of such allocations.
Study 1 also revealed evidence that employees react to the distress produced by mobility-based allocations with several classic distress reduction mechanisms. First, in the analyses that tested all three hypotheses, distressed subjects indicated that they wanted a different comparison person. Second, two of three analyses revealed that distressed subjects reported that they performed better than did others who were paid more. What is interesting about this finding is that equity theory would actually have predicted the reverse-that disadvantaged subjects would restore equity by developing reduced perceptions of their own contributions. Instead, distressed subjects reacted defensively, perhaps even realistically, in reporting that their performance was better than that of others who received higher outcomes. Third, in one of three analyses, disadvantaged subjects reported greater personal effort expenditure and desire to quit. We also explored reasons for reactions. With respect to all three hypotheses, disadvantaged subjects reported that they should have received equal pay for equal work but did not. In two of three cases, disadvantaged subjects reported that seeing the other worker's pay made them feel bad and that seeing the other worker^ pay did not make them feel good. And finally within the mobility-based allocations condition, highmobility subjects apparently felt guilty about their (undeserved?) good fortune. They, more than low-mobility subjects, reported that mobility should not have been the basis for pay decisions. This finding is consistent with prior research indicating that people who benefit by a standard they believe to be unfair experience "survivor guilt" (Brockner, Davy, & Carter, 1985; Brockner et al, 1986; Notz, Staw, &Cook, 1971 ).
There are two notable problems with Study 1. First, subjects were exposed to allocation standards that were based completely on performance level or completely on mobility. In real allocation settings, rewards are often a mix of these as well as other distribution standards. Thus, the rather extreme contrasts between performance-and mobility-based allocations may have been somewhat unnatural. Second, subjects were college students, who differ from actual employees in at least two respects. College students may be more accustomed to receiving outcomes that are based purely on performance level (e.&, course grades that are based on performance on exams and papers). Also, college students may have only limited experience with real allocation situations and may never have witnessed the need to consider factors other than performance in distributing group rewards. If this were so, being subjected to mobility-based allocations might be more shocking than it would be for real employees in real work settings. Study 2, which examined reactions to mobility-based allocations among actual employees, was designed with these problems in mind.
Study 2
Study 2 was a cross-sectional study in which we asked a heterogeneous sample of adults to provide information regarding their jobs. Respondents indicated the degree to which a variety of standards were used in determining employee salary at their places of employment, indicated how fair they thought each standard was, reported on feelings of satisfaction and perceived fairness of pay procedures, and indicated the degree to which they were inclined to engage in exit, voice, loyalty and neglect reactions to job dissatisfaction. 4 Consistent with the reasoning underlying Study 1 hypotheses, we predicted that subjects would believe that mobility was a less valid standard on which to base allocation decisions than was performance. Second, we predicted that subjects would feel more satisfied to the degree that they believed performance-based standards were applied to determine their pay levels and that subjects would feel less satisfied to the degree they believed that mobility was the standard for pay decisions. Thus, we hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1: Subjects will generally perceive that performance-based allocations are more fair and appropriate than are mobility-based allocations. Mean judgments of fairness will be higher for the performance standard than for the mobility standard.
Hypothesis 2: Distress will be greater to the degree that subjects perceive that allocations are based on mobility, and distress will be lower to the degree that subjects perceive that allocations are based on performance. Distress will be positively correlated with reports of degree of mobility-based allocations and will be negatively correlated with reports of degree of performance-based allocations.
Method
Subjects and procedure. Two hundred people (100 men, 100 women) were randomly selected from a local employment directory. Each per-son was mailed a packet including a Work and Satisfaction Questionnaire, a cover letter explaining the purpose of the project and assuring respondents of the confidentiality of their responses, a lottery ticket, and a stamped return envelope. Potential respondents were informed that if they returned their completed questionnaires and lottery tickets by a specified date, they would be eligible to win one of five $10 cash prizes. If people failed to respond to the first mailing (Wave 1), a reminder letter was sent (Wave 2), followed finally by a second set of material (Wave 3). The Post Office returned 38 packets to the investigators because of invalid addresses. Eight people contacted the investigators in writing or by telephone, reporting that the questionnaire didn't apply to them because they were self-employed, were the only employees at their workplace, were not currently employed, or were retired. Of the 154 packets that were delivered to valid potential respondents, 70 people completed and returned their questionnaires. Thus, the overall response rate for the study was 70 out of 154, or 45%.
Forty-six percent of the respondents were men (32 men, 38 women), 88% were White (11% Black, 1% Hispanic), and the majority were married (63% married, 1% widowed, 19% divorced, 17% never married). Respondents' median age was 42; their median education level was 3 years of college. They had been employed at their jobs for an average of 5 years; their median personal annual income was around $24,000. Seventy percent reported that they were involved in employee training, 69% reported that they supervised the work of other employees, 44% reported that they were involved in the evaluation of employee performance, and 27% reported that they made decisions regarding employee salaries. Thus, the sample resembled national labor force averages in most respects, but was slightly older, somewhat better educated, and earned slightly higher salaries.
Questionnaire. Respondents' perceptions of the actual bases for pay at their places of employment were measured with a 13-item commonresponse-format question: "At your company, to what degree is each of the following qualities considered in determining employees' pay levels?" The common-response options for each item were considered not at all, considered slightly, considered somewhat, and considered very much. Two items concerned the performance standard: "How well they do their jobs" and "How good they are at their jobs." Three items concerned the mobility standard: "Probability they'd accept another job offer if they had one," "How likely it is that they will switch to a different job" and "How good an alternative job they could obtain." Two items concerned supervisor liking for employees: "How friendly they are with the person who determines their salaries" and "How much their supervisor likes them." Items were also included to assess the following: effort expenditure ("How hard they work"), hourly work ("How many hours a day they work"), dedication ("How devoted they are to the company"), social skill ("How well they get along with their coworkers"), seniority ("Seniority-how long they have worked here"), and age ("How old they are-older employees get higher salary increases"). Employees were also asked to indicate which of the factors just mentioned had the greatest impact on their salary: "Which of these factors has had the most impact on your personal salary? (please indicate four factors from the list above that have most influenced your own salary level)." Subjects' perceptions of the fairness of each distribution standard were measured with a 13-item common-response-format questionnaire: "In your opinion, to what degree should each of the following qualities be considered in determining employees' pay levels-how fair is each of these criteria as the basis for salary decisions? (circle one for each item)." The response options for each item were not at all fair, slightly fair, somewhat fair, and extremely fair. Subjects rated each of the 13 items for which they had previously reported actual impact, for example, performance level, mobility level, and seniority.
Feelings about pay standards were measured with 5-point Likerttype scales. Pay satisfaction was measured with "in general, how satisfied do you feel with your pay level," "all things considered, do you believe that your pay level is fair," and "compared to other similar employees, do you believe that your pay level is appropriate?" Perception of procedural fairness was measured with "in general, how satisfied do you feel with your company's procedure for determining employee pay levels," "all things considered, do you believe that your company's procedure for determining employee pay levels is a fair one" and "compared to other company's procedures, do you think your company^ system is a good one?" Job satisfaction was measured whh "all things considered, how satisfied do you feel with your job," "how does your job compare to your ideal job," "if you had to decide all over again whether to take your job, what would you decide," "how does your job measure up to the sort of job you wanted when you took it," and "if a friend asked if he or she should apply fora job like yours with your employer, what would you recommend?"
As in Study 1, we also measured possible reactions to dissatisfaction. However, in Study 2, we assessed reactions using the exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect model-a model with demonstrated utility in characterizing reactions to job dissatisfaction. In this model, exit and neglect are destructive reactions that differ in terms of activity/passivity, and voice and loyalty are constructive reactions that differ in terms of activity/ passivity (cf. Rusbult, FarreU, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988; Rusbult & Lowery, 1985) . Subjects indicated degree of agreement with each of 13 statements, each o f which had the same response options, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The exit hems were "I have recently spent some time looking for another job" "when working conditions here decline I think a lot about quitting," and "1 often think about quitting my job and looking around for a different job" The voice items were "when I think of an idea that will benefit my company I make a determined effort to implement it," "I sometimes discuss problems at work with my employer/supervisor" and "I often make active attempts to change working conditions here." The loyalty items were "I generally say good things about my company even when other people criticize it," 'Tve found that patience is a virtue at my company, -most problems seem to solve themselves with time," and "the people in charge of this company generally know what they're doing, and 1 trust them to take care of any problems that emerge at work." The neglect items were "now and then I call in sick or arrive at work late just because I really am not in the mood for work that day" "now and then there are work days where I just don't put much effort into my work," "I care very little about what happens to this company as long as I get a paycheck," and "sometimes when I dont feel like working I will work slowly or make errors." 5 Reliability of measures. Several items were averaged to form a single measure of some constructs. To ensure that this was appropriate, reliability coefficients were calculated for each set. These analyses revealed acceptable alphas for the items intended to measure pay satisfaction (.87), procedural fairness (90), job satisfaction (.88), exit (.72), voice C48), loyalty (.70), and neglect (.75); perceptions of the degree to which actual salaries were based on performance level (.89), mobility level (.88), and supervisor liking (.80); and perceptions of the fairness of allocation standards of performance level (.64), mobility level (.88), and supervisor liking (.69). Although a few coefficients were lower than ideal, inspection of the results for the individual items revealed that the findings for items within each set were quite similar, so the averaged measures were retained.
Results
Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of procedural fairness. First, we assessed subjects' judgments regarding the fairness of each distribution standard. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, these analyses revealed that subjects judged performance-based allocations to be considerably more fair than mobility-based allocations. The respective ordering of the means for the several standards were performance level (M = 3.86), effort expenditure (M= 3.78), hours worked (M = 2.86), employee dedication (M = 2.76), employee social skill (M = 2.73), seniority level (M-2.73), mobility level (M= 1.81), employee age (M= 1.75), and supervisor liking (M = 1.35). Using Tukey's honestly significant difference (HSD) test for repeated measures designs, we found that tests of the significance of the differences in the judged fairness of these standards revealed that there were three clear clusters: Performance level and effort expenditure were perceived to be the fairest standards; hours worked, employee dedication, social skill, and seniority level were perceived to be significantly less fair than both of these standards; and mobility level, employee age, and supervisor liking were in turn perceived to be significantly less fair than all of the middle-range standards. Thus, in support of Hypothesis 1, mobility was judged to be a less fair allocation standard than performance.
Do employees perceive that mobility is actually a consideration in the determination of salary levels at their places of employment? We examined subjects' lists of the factors that influenced their personal salary levels and found that the percentage of persons who listed each of the standards as one of the four main determinants of their personal salary levels was as follows: performance (40%), effort expenditure (16%), seniority (14%), mobility (8%), dedication (7%), social skill (6%), supervisor liking (5%), hours worked (3%), and age (1 %). Thus, it is clear that although performance level is widely perceived to be a common basis for pay decisions, employees believe that a variety of other standards, including employee mobility, also influence their pay levels.
Hypothesis 2: Mobility-based allocations and the experience of distress. Do employees experience greater distress to the degree that mobility is perceived to be a determinant of their pay levels, and is distress lower to the extent that salaries are perceived to be based on performance? We calculated correlations between subjects' reports of the extent to which each allocation standard was operative at their place of employment and (a) three measures of distress-pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, and perceived procedural fairness-and (b) four measures of reaction to dissatisfaction-exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the belief that performance level was considered in determining employee pay was positively correlated with pay satisfaction (r = .38, p < .05), job satisfaction (/-= .46, p < .05), and perceived procedural fairness (r= .46, p < .05). Also consistent with Hypothesis 2, the belief that mobility was considered in determining pay was negatively correlated with pay satisfaction (r = -.20, p < .05), job satisfaction (r = -.30, p < .05), and perceived procedural fairness (r --.08, ns). Tests of the significance of the differences between nonindependent correlations revealed that in each case, the correlations with performance level were significantly different from those with mobility level («(60) = 3.36, 4.82, and 3.28, respectively, all significant) . Do these differences translate into corresponding differences in tendencies toward exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect? Consistent with expectations, the belief that performance was considered in determining employee pay was significantly negatively correlated with destructive exit tendencies (r= -.35) and was marginally positively correlated with constructive voice tendencies (r -.18). Also consistent with expectations, the belief that mobility was considered in determining pay was positively correlated with exit (r = .20) and was marginally negatively correlated with voice (r= -.17). However, neither performance nor mobility was significantly correlated with loyalty or neglect (for performance, rs = -.01 and -.10, respectively; for mobility rs = -. 10 and .06, respectively). Tests of the significance of the differences between the respective correlations revealed that for both exit and voice, the correlations with performance level were significantly different from those with mobility (ts (60) = -3.19 and 2.06). Findings relevant to the other allocation standards are not relevant to the current hypotheses, but in general, we found that subjects reported greater satisfaction and perceived fairness to the extent that they believed pay was based on effort, dedication, social skill, and hours worked.
Sex of subject. To determine whether perceptions of allocation standards differed for women and men, a one-variable analysis of variance was performed on subjects' reports of the degree to which each of nine standards was applied at their place of employment and on judgments of the fairness of each standard. These analyses revealed significant or marginal differences in reports of the application of the following standards: performance level (Ms = 3.30 for men, 2.41 for women), F(l, 60) = 15.45, p < .001, effort expenditure (Ms = 2.97 for men, 2.22 for women), F(\, 60) = 8.07, p < .006, and social skill (Ms = 2.27 for men, 1.78 for women), F(l, 60) = 4.83, p < .032. Men and women differed marginally in reports of the fairness of the seniority allocation standard (Ms = 2.53 for men, 2.94 for women), F(l, 60) = 4.84, p < .092. However, the ordering of men's and women's reports of the fairness of the several standards did not differ.
Responsibility for salary allocations. To determine whether perceptions of allocation standards differed for people who were responsible for other employees' salary allocations, a onevariable analysis of variance was performed (responsible vs. not responsible for allocations) on subjects' reports of the degree to which each of nine standards was applied at their place of employment and on subjects' judgments of the fairness of each standard. These analyses revealed that those who were responsible for salary allocations differed from those who were not responsible in reports of the application of the following: performance level (Ms = 3.29 for allocators, 2.61 for others), F(l, 57) = 6.24, p < .015, effort expenditure (Ms » 3.05 for allocators, 2.35 for others), F(i, 57) = 5.49, p < .023, and seniority level (Ms = 3.32 for allocators, 2.58 for others), F(\, 57) = 7.48, p < .008. Allocators and nonallocators did not differ in reports of the fairness of the nine standards.
Discussion
Study 2 provided very good support for our hypotheses. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, subjects perceived performance- based allocations to be significantly more fair than mobilitybased allocations. This held for women and men, for people who were directly responsible for the allocation of salaries and for people who were not responsible for allocations. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, subjects reported greater distress to the degree that mobility was perceived to be a determinant of salary, and distress was lower to the extent that salaries were judged to be based on performance. The correlations with performance differed from those with mobility in all three cases, for pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, and perceptions of procedural fairness. Also supportive of Hypothesis 2, subjects reported lesser tendencies toward exit and greater tendencies toward voice to the degree that performance was perceived to be a determinant of salary and reported greater exit and lesser voice to the degree that mobility was perceived to be a determinant of salary. Both pairs of correlation differed significantly. We also observed some interesting sex differences. First, in comparison to men, women were less likely to report that pay was based on performance, effort, or social skill. Also, compared to men, women believed that the seniority standard was more fair. These findings may reflect the actual experiences of women and men in organizational settings, women perceiving that salary levels are based somewhat less on merit-based standards such as performance or effort. Finally, we observed some interesting differences between allocators and nonallocators:
Allocators were more likely to report that salary levels were based on performance, effort, and seniority. Thus, allocators more than other employees apparently believe that salary increases are based on relatively acceptable standards that are typically regarded as being relevant to the issue of employee merit.
General Discussion
The present research provided excellent support for predictions concerning reactions to performance-based and mobilitybased allocations. Results relevant to feelings of satisfaction and perceived fairness are summarized in Figures 1 and 2 . Study 1 demonstrated that people subjected to mobility-based allocations are far more distressed than are those exposed to performance-based allocations and that the experience of distress with mobility-based allocations is especially acute among people who are the direct victims of rational selective exploitation, those who perform at high levels but suffer constrained mobility. Study 2 demonstrated that actual employees perceive mobility-based allocations to be substantially less fair than performance-based allocations. Also, Study 2 employees reported greater distress to the degree that they believed salaries were based on mobility level and reported lesser distress to the degree that they believed salaries were based on performance level. Thus, employees clearly dislike mobility-based allocations.
Why is this finding important? Prior research has consistently demonstrated that managers often consider employee mobility in making allocation decisions and that this is especially likely among more competent employees. In all likelihood, managers behave in this way because they believe that they must do so, not because they want to or believe that it is fair. Indeed, in Study 2, we found that allocators and other employees do not differ in the degree to which they believe that mobility-based allocations are unfair. Furthermore, we have consistently found that rational selective exploitation is especially acute under conditions of instrumental orientation . That is, to the degree that organizational val- ues, managerial training, and company policies promote instrumental management, managers may find themselves engaging in rational selective exploitation. What they may not fully realize is the degree to which employees find this standard to be demoralizing. How demoralizing is rational selective exploitation? Two of the present findings suggest that although rational selective exploitation may appear to have immediate instrumental value, the long-term consequences of such a distribution norm are far from adaptive. First, employee feelings about this standard are tremendously negative. In Study 1, all employees disliked mobility-based allocations, even those who benefited from the application of this standard. Also, the distress experienced by the most direct victims of mobility-based allocations was acute: Among high-performance, low-mobility subjects in the mobility-based allocations condition, means for feelings of procedural fairness were 0.95 on an 8-point scale! Second, both studies revealed evidence that mobility-based allocations lead to increased desire to turn over. In light of the very high organizational costs of serious employee demoralization and turnover-especially when very competent employees turn over-the instrumental value of rational selective exploitation is seriously undermined.
The results of both studies were more consistent for measures of the experience of distress than for reactions to distress. In Study 1, we obtained consistent support with respect to choice of comparison person. However, we obtained only partial support with respect to other reactions: perceptions of own or comparison person's performance or effort expenditure, and intentions and actual decisions to quit. In Study 2, we obtained fairly consistent support with respect to reported tendencies toward exit and voice, but we obtained only partial support with respect to other reactions. In the Introduction, we reasoned that the several reactions to distress may be substitutable. If an individual reacts to distress with any one of several distress reduction mechanisms, discomfort may be eliminated and the need to engage in other methods may be nullified. The present findings are consistent with this line of reasoning, but it could alternatively be that the measures used in Studies 1 and 2 were unreliable, had low variance, or were otherwise flawed or inappropriate.
Several limitations of the present research should be noted. First, the external validity of Study 1 is limited in at least two respects: (a) Subjects were college students participating in a brief laboratory investigation of a simulated work setting, and (b) subjects were exposed to allocations that were based solely on performance level or mobility level, rather than being based on a blend of the two. Second, because the results of Study 2 are correlational, we cannot state unequivocally that exposure to mobility-based allocations causes distress. Employees who are disadvantaged by the allocation standards applied at their place of employment (and are therefore more distressed) may justify their feelings by asserting that allocations are based on patently unfair standards. Third, the external validity of Study 2 may be limited by the fact that participants were somewhat older and of higher socioeconomic status than national labor force averages. However, the weaknesses of one study tend to be complemented by the strengths of the other. Together, the studies provide good evidence regarding reactions to the experience of mobility-based allocations.
One final limitation of this research should be noted: Organizations typically have on hand a variety of methods for rewarding individual employees, including salary, praise, promotions, work resources (e.g., computers, access to support staff), and resources not directly related to work (eg., convenient parking spaces, pleasant offices). Future research should explore such alternative organizational rewards, examining allocators' tendencies to engage in mobility-based allocations-especially rational selective exploitation-with respect to each reward category and examining employee reactions with respect to each reward category
The present research contributes much to our knowledge of fairness and justice in organizational settings. Employees clearly perceive mobility-based allocations to be considerably less fair and personally satisfying than performance-based allocations. Furthermore, the distress associated with mobilitybased allocations appears to be especially acute among persons who lose more as a consequence of the application of that standard, people whose performance is good but whose professional mobility is constrained. Earlier we speculated that employees may recognize the existence of rational selective exploitation, acknowledge its necessity, and neither regard such treatment as exploitative nor find such allocations to be particularly distressing. Although there was some evidence in Study 2 that employees may not necessarily regard mobility-based allocations as procedurally unfair, both studies demonstrated that mobility-based allocations are experienced as unsatisfactory and personally upsetting. Thus, the allocation phenomenon identified by Rusbult and her colleagues-the tendency to allocate greater rewards to employees who are mobile than to employees whose mobility is constrained, especially among the competent-appears to be appropriately termed. Rational selective exploitation would indeed appear to be experienced as seriously exploitative and unfair, especially by the direct victims of this form of allocation behavior.
